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NOTES
THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION
ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON PARODY: NO
LAUGHING MATTER
With the adoption of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
on January 16, 1996,1 the use of a trademark in a parody became
a potential violation of federal trademark law. This Note details
the effect of the legislation on using trademarks in a parody
context. Section I defines the relevance of parody and trademarks
in today's society. Section II explains the dimensions and charac-
teristics of dilution. Sections III and IV discuss the historical
development of dilution culminating with the details of the new
federal law. Sections V and VI consider dilution in the parody
context, looking to courts' past applications and considering the
future of parody under the new statute. The next two sections of
the Note focus on dilution defenses and other potential remedies for
trademark owners. Finally, the Note concludes with policy reasons
for lenient application of the Act to parody.
I. THE LINK BETWEEN PARODY AND TRADEMARKS
Parody' has been recognized as a valuable literary, political and
comical tool for hundreds of years.3 The worth of parody is
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (Supp. I 1995).
Parody is defined as
.a [work] in which the language and style of an author or work is closely
imitated for comic effect or in ridicule often with certain peculiarities
greatly heightened or exaggerated."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (Merriam-Webster Inc. ed., 1993).
" 'The widespread presence of parody suggests a greater importance in the
very ways in which the modern imagination and the modern sensibility
have been formed, and also suggests the organic function it has had in
539
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evidenced in the widespread appreciation of such authors as
Chaucer, Voltaire, Cervantes and Swift.4 In a parody, the author
seeks to express his ideas through humor. While some parody acts
as the messenger of a moral or political theme,5 parody can also be
silly and meaningless, as well as uncouth and vulgar.' However,
all parody shares one fundamental requirement: a humorous
subject.
Inevitably, there is a clash between broad trademark protection
and the use of trademarks in parody. Parody seeks to jest and
quip. When the subject of the parody is a trademark, the fusion
can lead to challenges by trademark owners that the value and
worth of the trademark is being diminished. But frequently, both
public consumers and trademark owners have two distinct views of
parody. While the public likely recognizes that parody is often a
trivial witty spoof, some trademark owners are concerned that the
public accepts the message or punch line of every parody at face
value. This fact is evidenced by the large amount of trademark
litigation in the area of parody.
On January 16, 1996, the parody theme pool was reduced upon
Congress' passing of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.7 Some
commentators have argued that the Trademark Dilution Act
effectively prevents using a trademark as a subject of parody for
fear of liability resulting from diluting the distinctive and commer-
the development of the primary modes of expression for perhaps the past
one hundred years."
DAVID KIREMIDJIAN, A STUDY OF MODERN PARODY 15 (Garland Publishing, Inc. ed., 1985).
See also A.S. MARTIN, ON PARODY 1-30 (New York, Henry Holt & Co. ed., Mershon Co. Press
1896) (providing a history of parody).
I GEOFFREY CHAUCER, CANTERBURY TALES (A.C. Cawley ed., J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd.
1966) (1400); VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (Richard Aldington trans., The Hanover House 1959)
(1759); MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, THE ADVENTURES OF DON QUIXOTE, DE LA
MANCHA, KNIGHT OF THE SORROWFUL COUNTENANCE, AND HIS HUMOROUS SQUIRE, SANCHO
(New York, W. Borradaile 1823) (1605); JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS (Arthur E.
Case ed., Ronald Press Co. 1938) (1726).
'See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314
(8th Cir. 1987) (noting that defendant's trademark infringement was perceived by the public
as promoting awareness of the nuclear war problem).
'See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,206, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that the defendant's movie which featured
replicas of plaintiffs uniforms may be obscene).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. I 1995).
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cial importance of a trademark.' However, this Note suggests that
little has changed since passage of the Act and courts will continue
to follow the same conservative path used in applying state anti-
dilution laws.
To fully understand the First Amendment repercussions that the
Trademark Dilution Act may have upon parody, it is important to
define the many roles a trademark9 may occupy in our society.
Most frequently, a trademark supplies the simplest means of
associating a product with its manufacturer. However, a trade-
mark can also be a symbol of quality in convincing purchasers to
try an unfamiliar product. Furthermore, some trademarks have
become symbols of a lifestyle or an image that is as desirable as the
products offered by the trademark owner. Tiffany's association
with luxury and affluence"0 and Coca-Cola's all-American ideal'
are examples of trademarks whose meanings have surpassed
simple product identification. Courts also have recognized the
prestige and rich symbolic meaning of the trademark in assessing
protection for trademark users.'2 Of course, it should also be
noted that trademark owners spend huge amounts of money each
year to promote their trademarks and the brand preferences marks
generate. For these expenditures, trademark owners demand
protection of the interests created by their marketing labors..
8 Theodore C. Max, Dilution Act May Limit Commercial Parodies, NAT'L L.J. May 20,
1996, at c13; Robert N. Kleiger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 857 (1997).
A trademark is defined as
"any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof (1) used
by a person ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods . .. from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
" SeeTiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836,843, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2 (D.
Mass. 1964) (finding that the names Tiffany ' and "Tiffany & Co." have acquired a distinct
secondary meaning of quality and prestige).
" See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1191, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that the Coca-Cola trademark has acquired a secondary
meaning).
12 Tiffany, 231 F. Supp. at 845 (holding that due to the stature associated with Tiffany's,
displaying the name on a bar was an unlawful use of the name).
1998]
3
Dopson: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and Its Effect On Parody: No L
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
II. DEFINING DILUTION
Dilution 3 is based upon the theory that a trademark may be
weakened or reduced by unapproved uses and thereby forfeits its
ability to clearly and unmistakably distinguish the source. 14 In
defining.how dilution may occur, courts have traditionally viewed
dilution through two theories, tarnishment and blurring. Although
tarnishment and blurring are distinct concepts, they both reduce
the value of the trademark to its owner by undermining its selling
power.'5
A. TARNISHMENT
A trademark is tarnished when it is linked "to products of shoddy
quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context
[resulting in having] the public ... associate the lack of quality or
lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs
unrelated goods." 6 Here, the effect of the unauthorized use is to
degrade or dilute the distinctive quality of the mark. 7 Whenever
a trademark is used in such a way to bring to mind the business,
services, goods or mark of another's trademark, there is potential
for dilution through tarnishment by interfering with the images
associated with the trademark." To prove tarnishment of a
trademark occurred, the owner must demonstrate that the
" Dilution is defined in the federal statute as "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. I 1995). Over the years, courts
have also attempted to define dilution. Dilution is the "watering down of the potency of a
mark and the gradual debilitation of its selling power." Toys R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie
Shop, Inc., 559 F.Supp. 1189, 1208, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). It has also
been defined as the "whittling away of an established trade-mark's selling power and value
through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products." Allied Maintenance Corp.
v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1164-5, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (N.Y.
1977) (quoting 1954 N.Y. Legis Ann. at 9).
,4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:68
(4th ed. 1996) (defining dilution via blurring).
"RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMON § 25 cmt. c (1995).
IS Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936 (2d Cir.
1994).
17 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:69.
IS RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETIMON § 25 cmt. g (1995).
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defendant's use is "likely to come to the attention of the prior user's
prospective purchasers and that the use is likely to undermine or
damage the positive associations evoked by the mark. 9
Some courts found tarnishment occurred when the trademark
was placed in the presence of obscene or illegal conduct.20 For
example, in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., a district court found the similarities between the main
character of a pornographic film and a Dallas Cowboy cheerleader
were sufficient to issue an injunction preventing distribution or
exhibition of the film.21 Similarly in Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., a district court found that the use of the words "Enjoy
Cocaine" pictured on a poster in the plaintiffs distinctive script
tarnished the Coca-Cola trademark.22 However, tarnishment has
not been limited in application to vulgar uses of a trademark.23
B. BLURRING
In comparison to tarnishment, blurring occurs when "[clustomers
or prospective customers ... see the plaintiffs mark used ... on a
plethora of different goods and services."24 Blurring is based on
the idea that a trademark can be so distinctive and well-known
that it functions as an additional selling tool for the product, and
19 Id. The Restatement provides an illustration of tarnishment: Bank, A, uses the term
"Cookie Jar" to identify its teller machines. B then opens a topless bar across the street from
A, and calls it "Cookie Jar." Even though A's clients are unlikely to believe that A sponsors
the bar, B may be liable to A under a tarnishment theory if A's clients associate A's
trademark or business with the images created from B's use of the mark. Id. at illus. 3.
" See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979) (finding that actresses were dressed in substantially similar cheerleading uniform);
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prod., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D.Ga. 1981) (holding that
tarnishment exists when trademark characters are shown engaged in sexual intercourse).
2' Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205.
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
See Chemical Corp. of Amer. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 306 F.2d 433, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
524 (5th Cir. 1962) (granting an injunction against the use of the slogan 'Where there's life
... there's bugs," which was similar to plaintiff's slogan, "where there's life ... there's
Bud."); Gucchi Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (preventing
defendant from using the term "Gucchi Goo" and the plaintiff's distinctive stripes on diaper
bags).
U MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:68 (discussing blurring as "the classic... injurious
impact" of dilution as envisioned by its original proponents).
1998] 543
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as such may be dulled by others' use of the mark.' Blurring
results when "the defendant uses or modifies the plaintiffs
trademark to identify the defendant's goods and services, raising
the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a
unique identifier" of the product.26 Examples of blurring are
Krispy Kreme tires and Tiffany wedding cakes.
An action for blurring is more difficult to establish than an action
for tarnishment.27 The plaintiff trademark owner must be able to
prove a probable state of mind by the consumer, that the consumer
recognizes that the plaintiffs mark is being used as an identifying
symbol of another's product.2" This requirement is made even
more difficult by the lack of concrete evidence of inferences by
consumers. 29  Factors that are relevant in assessing whether
blurring has occurred include the sophistication of the purchas-
ers,30 whether the goods are sold in competing markets or are
competing products,3' and a comparison of the marketing methods
used by the plaintiff and defendant.3 2
In the face of concerns over the dilution and harm of famous
trademarks, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
in 1996.33 Congress enacted the statute to safeguard the owner's
goodwill in the trademark by preventing dilution of the mark.3"
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995).
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
SRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETON § 25 cmt. f (1995).
28 Id.
2Id.
"Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1961 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff's market, comprised of sophisticated consumers,
indicated that blurring was unlikely); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments,
Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 786 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding the sophistication of
purchasers reduced the likelihood of dilution).
"' But see Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 94, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2021 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding dilution cause of action is not available for use on competing goods).
= Id.
315 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. I 1995).
"See Max supra note 8, at c13 (prior to the Dilution Act, trademark infringement
required a likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act and dilution was not sufficient in
itself to constitute infringement).
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III. HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF DILUTION
The initial introduction of dilution has been traced back to Frank
Schechter, who first presented his ideas on dilution in 1927 in the
Harvard Law Review.' Schechter believed that "the preservation
of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only
rational basis for its protection.""6 In essence, Schechter sought
to liberate trademark rights entirely from the consumer confusion
rationale prevalent in trademark infringement analysis,37 suggest-
ing courts should focus on protecting the uniqueness of the
mark.8 Schechter argued that the real harm from concurrent
uses of the mark on different goods was not consumer deception,
but the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and
hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon
non-competing goods."39
Even though dilution is a relatively new legal theory, Congress'
history with trademark legislation goes back over a century."
Until the introduction of dilution, consumer confusion was the basis
for an action in trademark.4
While the Lanham Act provided a cause of action for infringe-
ment in 1946, thereby prohibiting any use of a trademark that is
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive," the
concerns of trademark dilution went unnoticed in the federal
legislation.42 However, one year after the enactment of the
Lanham Act, Massachusetts adopted the first anti-dilution state
"Frank I. Schtchter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927).8 Id. at 831.
97 See FRANK 1. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADEMARKS 150 (1925) (stating that consumer confusion appeared to be an exceedingly
tenuous and insubstantial basis for infringement claims).
Schechter, supra note 35, at 829.
Id. at 825. Schechter's description is often cited as the prevailing definition of dilution.
4 Kleiger, supra note 8, at 798. The first federal trademark legislation was enacted in
1870 and was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as overstepping the
authority bestowed by the Commerce Clause. The second statute was adopted in 1881, but
it was not until 1905 that the federal registration scheme reached marks in Interstate
commerce. The modern federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, was not enacted until
1946. Id.
41 Id.
42 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994).
1998] 545
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statute in 1947. 48 Illinois followed Massachusetts' initiative in
1953 and New York and Georgia adopted anti-dilution statutes in
1955. 44  It was not until eight years later that another state,
Connecticut, passed a statute condemning dilution.4" Then in
1964, the United States Trademark Association included dilution
in its Model State Trademark Bill.4' By the time the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act was signed into law in 1996, 28 states had
adopted anti-dilution statutes.47
The state anti-dilution statutes all possess three important
features that are relevant for comparison with the federal act.48
First, the statutes only serve to protect dilution of "distinctive"
marks,49 an unnecessary characterization under the new federal
law.5" Secondly, as also required by the federal statute,5 the
plaintiff must prove a likelihood of dilution before the defendant's
use will be enjoined.62 Finally, the only relief provided under the
state anti-dilution statutes is injunctive relief,53 while the federal
legislation allows for monetary damages if the plaintiff can show
malicious intent. 4
43 The Massachusetts statute stated that the "Jikelihood of injury to business reputation
or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for
injunctive relief... notwithstanding the abscence of competition between the parties or of
confusion as to the source of goods or services." Kleiger, supra note 8, at 811 (citing the Act
of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a).
"Id. at 812.
I ld.
The Model State Trademark Bill provides "Likelihood of injury to business reputation
or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark ... shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the abscence of competition between the parties or the abscence of confusion
as to the source of goods or services." MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (United States
Trademark Association 1964), reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:80.
" Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Washington adopted anti-dilution state statutes before the
federal legislation. McCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:78: Furthermore, Ohio has recognized
injunctive relief for dilution, as part of its common law. Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info.
Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861, 1865 (6th Cir. 1987).
"For a detailed discussion of the federal act, see infra notes 78-96.
4' Kleiger, supra note 8, at 813.
50 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (Supp. I 1995). The Act provides remedies for dilution "of the
distinctive quality of the mark." Id. at (c)(1). (emphasis added)
a1 Id.
652 Kleiger, supra note 8, at 813.
8 Id.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. I 1995).
546
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Even after many states passed anti-dilution statutes, courts were
reluctant to apply the doctrine. Decisions of courts applying state
dilution laws suggest that courts are confused by the dilution
doctrine and therefore are unwilling to deliver relief to trademark
owners based upon dilution. An examination of the application of
the New York anti-dilution statute in parody cases demonstrates
the uncertainty and inconsistency courts have shown in this area
of the law. The New York statute provides a good example, as it
was one of the first state statutes passed and has been the subject
of extensive judicial interpretation.
New York courts may have the most experience applying a state
anti-dilution statute in the parody context, but the decisions still
lack clarity in defining lines for the cause of action. Repealed in
1997, the New York anti-dilution statute provided that:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of
dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade
name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases
of infringement of a mark registered or not regis-
tered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstand-
ing the absence of competition between the parties or
the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
services.5
In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc. ,56 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussed competition as a very
important factor,57 although the statute clearly indicates it is not
dispositive. In Hormel, the court recognized that a distinctive mark
and a likelihood of dilution were the only requirements to establish
a claim." The measure of dilution in this case was through
blurring or tarnishment, and the court found neither occurred.59
Previously the court fashioned an expanded definition of dilution
in order to grant an injunction to the plaintiff in Deere & Co. v.
55 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1961) (repealed Jan. 1, 1997).
73 F.3d 497, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (2d Cir. 1996).
6 Id. at 507.
Id. at 506 (citing Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625, 217 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 658 (2d Cir. 1983)).
" Id. at 506.
1998] 547
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MTD Products, Inc."° The defendants in that case depicted the
plaintiffs trademark deer as a smaller, animated version in a
commercial for their comparable lawn tractor product.6 ' Although
the court found no consumer confusion, and the trademark was
used only to compare products, the court held that the defendants
violated the statute by reason of the likelihood of diminishing the
strength of the Deere trademark.6 2 The court specifically noted
that tarnishment and blurring were not at issue in this case, and
that "the blurring/tarnishment dichotomy does not necessarily
represent the full range of uses that can dilute a mark under New
York law."63 This "new" strain of dilution, the predatory intent
test created under Deere, suggests that the court was wavering on
the breadth of dilution."
Yet another definition of dilution under the Second Circuit's
interpretation is provided in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday
Dell Publishing Group, Inc.6 In Cliff Notes, the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the defendant from producing "Spy Notes," a parody of the
paperback books that Cliff Notes publishes." The court vacated
the district court's injunction67 using another approach: the
balancing test.6' The balancing approach considered the likeli-
hood of consumer confusion as to the source of the goods while
allowing special leeway for parody and other artistic expressions.69
However, confusion was not recognized as a factor within the New
York statute.70 The court, finding that it was unlikely for a
consumer to believe that "Spy Notes" was a study guide produced
by Cliff Notes, held in favor of the defendant." The court also
noted in retrospect that the public interest in free expression
6* 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
6'Id. at 41.
62 Id. at 43-44.
6 Id. at 44.
6Interestingly, two years later the court specified that the Deere ruling would be "better
understood as a recognition of a broad view of tarnishment," despite the strong repugnance
of the doctrine in the earlier decision. Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 507.
886 F.2d 490, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (2d Cir. 1989).
"Id. at 490.
Id. at 497.
6 Id. at 494.
aId. at 494-95.
70 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1961) (repealed Jan. 1, 1997).
7' Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 496.
548 [Vol. 5:539
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outweighed the potential consumer confusion."2
The New York example demonstrates a widespread initial
disapproval of dilution by courts which eventually resulted in a
gradual over-broadening of dilution tests. Robert N. Kleigher
suggests three factors at work to explain the hostility courts
expressed toward state anti-dilutions statutes.73  First, courts
were skeptical about the power that the statutes vested in the
trademark owner, allowing him absolute control over the uses of
his mark.74 Secondly, it was difficult for courts to define dilution
and the interests protected.75 Lastly, some courts were concerned
that application of the state statutes was preempted by the
Lanham Act, which provides a cause of action for trademark
infringement 76  In light of these problems, courts had granted
relief solely on state anti-dilution violations in only sixteen cases by
1996."
IV. SPECIFICS OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act was enacted on Jan. 16,
1996."8 After almost thirty years of state regulation, trademark
dilution became a federal cause of action.7 ' The legislative history
suggests two main reasons for federal regulation."0 First, because
the cause of action and the remedies varied among states, federal
legislation was needed to bring consistency and uniformity into this
area of law."' By adopting a federal rule, an injunction can be
applied across the U.S., not just in those states with anti-dilution
statutes.8 2 The patch-quilt protection for trademarks under state
7 Id. at 497. See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding injunction, despite first amendment claims, in case
concerning pornographic movie with blatantly false and explicitly misleading advertise-
ments).
Kleigher, supra note 8, at 816.
74 Id.
7 td. at 816-17.
76 Id. at 817.
Id. at 820.
76 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. I 1995).
" See discussion on state anti-dilution statutes, infra notes 43-47.
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law encouraged forum-shopping and litigation.' Secondly, the Act
meets the international obligations for protection of famous
marks." Specifically, the terms of the Act are consistent with the
Paris Convention and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, which is part of the Uruguay Round
of the Gatt agreement." The legislative history also notes that
the Act is intended to assist the executive branch of the govern-
ment in negotiating protection for U.S. trademarks in foreign
countries, since through this Act the U.S. now affords protection
against dilution for foreign marks.86
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act provides a cause of action
for a "commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution
of the distinctive quality of the mark." 7 In essence, three ele-
ments are required to prove an action for dilution. The trademark
at issue must be a famous mark, used by the defendant in a
commercial manner in commerce, and the defendant must have
caused dilution of the mark."
Note that a mark does not have to be a registered trademark to
be protected under this legislation. When the bill was originally
introduced, it only applied to famous registered marks.8 9 Howev-
er, the Patent and Trademark Office argued that limiting protec-
tion to registered marks would undermine the United States'
position with its trading partners, because famous marks deserve
protection regardless of whether the marks are registered in the
country where protection is sought.90
The Act provides two types of relief for plaintiffs: (1) an injunc-
tion and (2) damages if it is determined the defendant "willfully




87 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX1) (Supp. 1 1995). Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia has held that the Act does not apply retroactively, under the Supreme
Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products Inc. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
OfficeMax, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 409, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1194 (E.D. Va. 1996).
88 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cXl) (Supp. I 1995).
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intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of
the famous mark."9'
A number of defenses exist against an action for dilution. The
statutory language of the Trademark Dilution Act includes four
affirmative defenses to trademark dilution.92 These defenses
include noncommercial use of the trademark,93 news reporting and
commentary," and fair use by way of comparative advertising to
identify competing products.9" Federal registration of a trademark
is also an affirmative defense to a federal or state law dilution
claim.96
V. COURTS' RELUCTANT APPLICATION OF DILUTION STATUTES
IN THE PARODY CONTEXT
Even though anti-dilution statutes have been passed in state
legislatures, courts appear leery of applying dilution statutes to
parody issues.97 By and large, judges seem reluctant to give
dilution concepts broad application for fear of eliminating all
competition in an effort to prevent trade name infringement.98
Courts have tried to escape the dilution issue through several
means: (1) characterizing dilution statutes as permissive, (2)
applying the statutes only where confusion existed, and (3)
applying the statutes only where there was no confusion."
Rather than apply the anti-dilution statutes, courts have often
looked to the traditional confusion analysis,"e which is based





"Id. § 1125 (c)(3); H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1032. The legislative history notes that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act does not
pre-empt state anti-dilution statutes, which could still apply in cases involving locally famous
marks. Id. at 4.
7 Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks As Speech. Constitutional Implications of the Emerging
Rationales For the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 183 (1982).
McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:114.
Denicola, supra note 97, at 184.
'"Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment
Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1986).
1998] 551
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upon Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act.1"1 This section protects
the owner of a federally registered trademark from unauthorized
uses that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive." 10 2 The confusion analysis is also supported by frequent-
ly applied Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'0 3 Section 43 protects
unregistered words or symbols by preventing any "false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mislead-
ing representation of fact" in connection with the sale of any
services or goods."°4
The Lanham Act prohibits unauthorized trademark uses in an
effort to further three policies against consumer confusion. First,
banning confusing uses prevents unjust enrichment for the
infringer who has benefited from the use of another's respected
trademark.0 5 Further, the prohibition serves to reduce mislead-
ing information in the marketplace.' ° Finally, it precludes harm
to the trademark owner's reputation from inferior, infringing
products.' 7
Application of the traditional confusion doctrine questions
whether actual confusion has occurred in the public marketplace.
Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Manufactur-
ing Co. is a well-known case exemplifying the confusion doctrine in
the parody context0'0 In that case, the defendants manufactured
a poster that depicted a young, obviously pregnant girl in a Girl
Scout uniform; under the picture were the words "BE PRE-
PARED."" 9 The court found that the remote possibility of confu-
sion would be momentary since the theme was clearly at odds with
Girl Scout values. Furthermore, the poster was marketed through
different channels than traditional Girl Scout posters."0 The
court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs request for an injunc-
tion."'
'0' 15 U.S.C. § 1114(lXa) (1994).
102 id.
'm Denicola, supra note 97, at 162.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(aXl) (1994).
'o' Shaughnessy, supra note 100, at 1084.
10 Id.
107 Id.
" 304 F. Supp. 1228, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
' Id. at 1230.
"oId. at 1231.
. Id. at 1233.
552 [Vol. 5:539
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More recently, the Second Circuit considered the issue of actual
confusion in denying an injunction to the plaintiff in Hormel Foods
Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc."2  The Second Circuit
found that no consumer confusion existed" 3 between Henson's
wild boar muppet Spa'am and Hormel's meat product SPAM." 4
The court reasoned that the distinctly different settings for the
products-a children's movie and the advertising and packaging of
a luncheon meat-would prevent any potential confusion."'
A more modem approach to the trademark parody problem
utilizes an expanded form of the confusion doctrine. This expanded
form prohibits uses that simply give rise to a public perception of
approval by the owner of the mark."' At least one court has
suggested that Congress intended that the expanded confusion
rationale be included in its 1989 revision of Section 43 of the
Lanham Act." 7
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications provides a good
example of a court's use of the expanded confusion doctrine.1 8
Anheuser-Busch sued the publishers of Snicker magazine for using
Michelob symbols in a mock advertisement that stated "One Taste
and You'll Drink It Oily"." 9 A small disclaimer was placed at the
bottom of the ad identifying it as an editorial. 20
The court based its likelihood-of-confusion result upon a survey
prepared by the plaintiff.'2 ' Over half the people surveyed
believed Snicker needed Anheuser-Busch's approval to publish the
ad,"'22 and the majority construed the ad as suggesting that
Michelob beer contains oil. 23
112 73 F.3d 497, 508 (2d Cir. 1996).
1s Id. at 504.
114 Id. at 501.
'1 Id. at 504.
1 Shaughnessy, supra note 100, at 1082.
"
7 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774, 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1296 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining the 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) was expanded to prevent
confusion as to origin, sponsorship, or approval).
'
8 Id. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314
(8th Cir. 1987) (applying an expanded version of the confusion doctrine).
19Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 772.
12 Id.
121 Id. at 775.12
2 Id.
1'2 Id. at 777.
19981 553
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Although there was no extensive public survey"2 performed in
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., the court issued an injunction
to restrain the sale of a poster that read "Enjoy Cocaine" in the
same colors and configuration of Coca-Cola's trademark. 12  The
court discussed the similarities of the parties' enterprises, the
similarities between the marks, and characterized the "ordinary
purchaser" as ignorant in finding a likelihood of confusion. 121 In
drawing this conclusion, the court cited a 1910 opinion describing
the typical purchaser as including "the unthinking and the
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but
are governed by appearances and general impressions." 27
VI. CONCERN FOR PARODIES UNDER THE FEDERAL STATUTE
Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a plaintiff may easily
obtain a judgement of trademark dilution for use of a mark in a
parody, 2 ' based upon the broad elements of the cause of ac-
tion.'29 The factors the statute provides to determine whether
the action meets the first element, a famous mark, can stretch to
include virtually any trademark that would even be sufficiently
well-known for use in a parody. 80 Furthermore, because the
However, several members of the public had attributed responsibility to the plaintiff
for the poster. The court accepted this as consumer confusion. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-90, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
125 id.
- Id. at 1190.
' Id. (citing Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73,75 (2d Cir. 1910)).
"
2 SThe owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and
upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has
become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark..." 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(1) (Supp. I 1995).
'9 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1995).
"
0 In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade
554
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statute does not designate a standard bright line rule for determin-
ing exactly what constitutes dilution, it is arguable that courts are
still free to fashion their own definitions and approaches."' In
fact, the legislative history states that the definition of dilution in
the statute includes "all forms of dilution recognized by the courts,
including dilution by blurring, by tarnishment and disparagement,
and by diminishment."32
Since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was signed into law,
a number of trademark parody cases have been decided under its
provisions. An examination of several of these cases suggests that
even after passage of the federal law, there is no clear indicator of
when dilution exists.
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., the
publisher of the popular children's books sued the publishers,
authors and illustrators of The Cat Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr.
Juice.'33 The defendants claimed that the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act did not apply to the parody based on the O.J. Simpson
scandal because the use of the trademarks were non-commercial
and, therefore, permitted by the Act. 4 But the court held that
"the First Amendment would apply to this use of the trademarks
at issue, and that as an expressive use, this use is exempt from the
used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (cX1) (A)-(H) (Supp. I 1995). There is no register of "famous" marks.
Therefore, fame must be determined on a case-by-case basis. This ambiguity will lead to
unpredictability in applying the statute and providing legal advice. MCCARTHY, supra note
14, at § 24:90.
"' The Second Circuit's reasoning in Deere & Co., v. MTD Products, Inc. shows this
unpredictability. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). The court granted an injunction against the
defendant who had produced an altered form of the widely recognized John Deere deer logo.
Id. The court reasoned "the blurring/tarnishment dichotomy does not necessarily represent
the full range of uses that can dilute a mark .. .," finding the competition and concern of
unfavorable associations with the deer required an injunction. Id. at 44. However, the
Second Circuit later characterized the decision as an expansion of the tarnishment doctrine.
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996).
"3 H.R. REp. NO. 104-374, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035
(emphasis added).
"s 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
' Id. at 1573-74.
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reach of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act."" 5
Then, in Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed to enjoin the defendants'
use of "HAHA" in connection with their convenience store.
1 36
While the plaintiffs own over 500 convenience stores in the
northeast United States and have an annual advertising budget of
over $6 million, the defendant owns one convenience store and had
spent less than $500 on advertising at the time of the hearing. 37
The court found that Wawa was indeed a famous mark and that
the products marketed by the parties were similar.1 38 Further-
more, the lack of sophistication within the targeted consumer
groups supported the finding that dilution occurred.3 9
The owners of "The Velvet Elvis," a lounge in Texas, argued that
the bar was a parody of "a time when lava lamps, velvet paintings,
and bell bottoms were popular" and that the First Amendment
protected the use of the mark. 40 The plaintiffs disagreed, argu-
ing that the defendants' use of the "wholesome image of Elvis" in
conjunction with "a tacky bar that indiscriminately displays explicit
and almost pornographic paintings of nude women" tarnished their
mark.'41 The court agreed with the defendants, finding that no
tarnishment existed. 42 "[Tihe nude pictures and the bar's inten-
tional tackiness are an obvious part of the parody and are associat-
ed, to the extent any association is made, for purposes of the
parody only, rather than for creating a permanent derogatory
connection in the public's mind between the two businesses.
"143
VII. APPLICABLE DEFENSES
The recent decisions confirm that viable defenses exist against
claims of dilution in trademark parody cases. The best defenses
'
T Id. at 1574.
Wawa, Inc., v. Haaf, No. CIVA.96-4313, 1996 WL 460083,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996).
137 Id. at *2.
I8 1d. at *2-3.
11 Id. at *3.
140 Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
141 Id. at 799.
142 Id. at 783.
"' Id. at 799.
556 [Vol. 5:539
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are arguments that the plaintiffs mark is not distinctive or famous,
the defendant's use of the mark is a noncommercial use, and the
First Amendment prevents application of the statute to parody.
The comparative advertising and commentary defenses are also
available but will likely be less helpful in rescuing the parodist
from the legal clutches of trademark owners.
A. COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING
The comparative advertising defense' has long been recog-
nized in the trademark dilution area and rests on the idea that a
trademark is the most economical and feasible way to transmit
information about a product and its owner to the public. " '
McCarthy provides an example of an unfair comparative use where
a competitor's trademark is used in an advertisement and is altered
so that consumers may "come to attribute unfavorable characteris-
tics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with inferior
goods and services." 46 The comparative advertising defense is
not discussed in detail in this Note because the use of a parody in
such a situation is very unlikely.
B. COMMENTARY
The commentary defense provided for in the statute is very strict,
providing that "all forms of news reporting and news commentary"
are not actionable. 47 This defense was included in the statute to
ensure that the federal law would not interfere with the use of
trademarks in conveying news and other socially useful informa-
tion.'48 The section also protects "allegedly tasteless or nasty
modifications of famous marks in the media in newspaper cartoons,
magazine stories, Internet home pages and the like."'49 Again,
'"Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising
or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark"
is not actionable under the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(4)(A) (Supp. I 1995).
14 Shaughnessy, supra note 100, at 1105.
146 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:97. 1.
"7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX4)(C) (Supp 1 1995) (emphasis added).
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this defense is not discussed in detail since it may only be applied
within specific factual parameters.
C. PLAINTIFF'S MARK IS NOT DISTINCTIVE OR FAMOUS
To prove a case of trademark dilution, an owner must show that
the mark is famous and that a distinctive quality of the mark has
been diluted.' Therefore, if a parodist can show that the plain-
tiffs mark is not famous or is not distinctive, his use of the mark
is not prohibited by the Act. The statute provides eight factors that
a court may consider in deciding whether a mark is famous and
distinctive.' These factors are: (1) the degree of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (2) the duration and extent of
use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which
the mark is used; (3) the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark; (4) the geographical extent of the trading
area in which the mark is used; (5) the channels of trade for the
goods or services with which the mark is used; (6) the degree of
recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade
used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought; (7) the nature and extent of use of the same
or similar marks by third parties; and (8) whether the mark was
federally registered.'52
The section-by-section analysis of the statute in the legislative
history provides more detail for several of the factors.15 The first
factor that relates to distinctiveness denotes that a mark may be
famous even if it is not inherently distinctive."64 In conjunction
with the second factor, "generally a famous mark will have been in
use for some time." 5 With respect to the geographic fame of the
mark, it must "extend throughout a substantial portion of the
U.S.""'56 The legislative history notes that a mark "protected
against dilution can have acquired its fame in connection with one
'50 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cXI).
152 Id.
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type' of good or service and, as a result, be so famous as to be
entitled to protection against dilution when used on or in connec-
tion with an unrelated good or service."" 7
The Restatement also provides clues as to which mark may be
considered distinctive. "As a general matter, a trademark is
sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a nonconfusing use if the
mark retains its source significance when encountered outside the
context of the goods or services with which the mark is used by the
trademark owner."158  However, a mark is not adequately
distinctive if the mark sparks an association with a particular
product only when used in context with that product 159 More
specifically, the reporter's notes suggest that use of mark in a
parody is unlikely to dilute the mark's distinctiveness because the
use refers back to the trademark owner.'6°
The Restatement further notes that a mark may be distinctive in
a select market, and if so, the owner is only protected from diluting
uses of the mark directed toward that consumer class.1 61 Use of
the mark in a broader market is not actionable, even if it produces
dilution in the smaller group.'62
Examining cases recently decided under the new statute provides
illustrations of what courts have considered in determining whether
a mark is famous and distinctive. In Novo Nordisk of North
America, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York did not consider any of the optional
factors, but concluded that the plaintiffs mark was not famous
because it only represented one percent of the entire market for its
product. 163 Again, without referencing the factors, the same court
found that Ringling Brothers' registered mark "The Greatest Show
on Earth" was famous, due in. part to its use across the U.S. for
"' Id. at 8.
'
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. e (1995).
5
9 Id.
60Id. at reporter's notes, cmt. f (citing Yankee Pub., Inc. v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 267, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) and Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1991)).
161 Id.
162 Id.
" Novo Nordisk of North Am., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No 96 Civ. 5787 (BSJ), 1996 WL
497018 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.30, 1996). Here the plaintiffs, manufacturers of insulin, attempted to
enjoin Eli Lilly from using its mark on the packaging of insulin injectors. Id.
19981 559
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over one hundred years.'"
The court explicitly considered the statutory factors in American
Express Co. v. CFK, Inc."6 5 The court found that "Don't Leave
Home Without.. ." is a distinctive and famous trademark.' In
applying the factors, the court found distinctiveness had been
acquired through over 20 years of worldwide use and millions of
dollars spent to create worldwide recognition in the travel related
market."17 Furthermore, the court noted the mark was federally
registered and the lack of evidence demonstrating the mark was
being used by any third parties without plaintiffs' authority.6
Similarly in Trustee of Columbia University in the City of New
York v. Columbia/HCA Heathcare Corp., the court explicitly
considered the factors.169 The court ultimately found that the
plaintiff failed to establish ownership of a distinctive mark. 70 In
explaining the decision, the court stated the plaintiffs mark,
Columbia, had been undermined by third party uses across the
United States and the plaintiff failed to prove that the mark was
a unique identifier of their services.'
D. NONCOMMERCIAL USE
The legislative history notes that the Act adequately protects
First Amendment concerns exposed by the media by requiring the
use to be commercial in order to prove an action for dilution. 72
Additionally the "use in commerce" requirement7 3 demands
"some aspect of interstate commerce to be present before the
, Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937
F. Supp. 204, 40 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). However, the plaintiffs were still
denied an injunction against the defendants' use of "The Greatest Bar on Earth," after failing
to establish irreparable harm or a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 214.
's' 947 F. Supp. 310, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1756 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
Id. at 316.
' Id. at 318.
," Id. at 315-16.
169 964 F. Supp. 733, 749, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
170 Id. at 750.
171 Id.
712 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
'" The statute provides an injunction for a "commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cXl) (Supp. 1 1995).
560 (Vol. 5:539
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dilution provision can be triggered." 17' The legislative history
continues, stating that "[niothing in this bill is intended to alter
existing case law on the subject of what constitutes 'commercial'
speech."
175
The Restatement of Unfair Competition has noted that noncom-
mercial use means nontrademark uses of a mark.1 76 Nontrade-
mark uses "do not create an association with a different user's
goods, services, or business."77 Under these criteria, use of a
trademark in a parody would not be a prohibited use, since the
mark is being used to refer to the original mark. A parody use of
a mark, therefore, would "serve to confirm rather than undermine
the associational significance of the mark. 178
In 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
characterized a noncommercial use as a non-trademark use. 179
In this case, the defendants included an article entitled "L.L.
Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog" in a fall issue of the magazine
High Society.8 ° The court distinguished the defendants' use of
the trademark from a commercial use by noting the article was
labeled a parody on its face and the mark was not used to identify
or promote goods or services to consumers.1 '
In the Dr. Seuss parody case discussed above, the plaintiffs
argued that the defendants' use "cannot be accepted as 'noncom-
mercial' because the marks were used to 'make their book more
entertaining and to consequently, sell more copies.'"' 82
However, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California responded that "an expressive use is not rendered
commercial by the impact of the use on sales."8 3
114 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
'7 Id. at 4.
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In the future, whether a use may be deemed a commercial use
will likely rest on whether the use of the mark was a "trademark
use" (i.e., used to advertise or promote a product by suggesting
inaccurate sponsorship or origin). If courts continue to accept this
definition of what denotes a commercial use, the noncommercial
defense will prove a valuable weapon for parodists.&'
E. FIRST AMENDMENT
The law of trademark dilution has developed to combat unautho-
rized and harmful uses of a mark by another party to identify and
promote dissimilar products, 8" and the Constitution is not offend-
ed when the statutes prevent these types of uses of a mark.
However, when a party is not using the mark to manufacture or
advertise dissimilar items, the First Amendment becomes an issue.
Famous trademarks offer a particularly powerful
means of conjuring up the image of their owners, and
thus become an important, perhaps at times indis-
pensable, part of the public vocabulary. Rules
restricting the use of well-known trademarks may
therefore restrict the communication of ideas .... If
the defendant's speech is particularly unflattering, it
is also possible to argue that the trademark has been
tarnished by the defendant's use. The constitutional
implications of extending the misappropriation or
tarnishment rationales to such cases, however, may
1 It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court has recently dictated
that the commercial element does not render the fair use exception inapplicable in the
context of a copyright parody case. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569, 29
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (1994). There the Court found:
mhe commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one
element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character ....
The mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not
insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial
character of a use bars a finding of fairness.
Id. at 584 (citing Harper & Rowe, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561, 225
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1073 (1985).
1,' See Max, supra note 8, at c13 (noting Congressional concerns of safeguarding the
owner's goodwill in the mark).
562 [Vol. 5:539
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often be intolerable. Since a trademark may fre-
quently be the most effective means of focusing
attention on the trademark owner or his product, the
recognition of exclusive rights encompassing such use
would permit the stifling of unwelcome discus-
sion. 8
Because parody and commercial speech are within the protection
of the First Amendment "free speech" clause of the Constitu-
tion,"8 7 it is questionable whether the Trademark Dilution Act
oversteps constitutional bounds in its prohibition of unauthorized
commercial use of trademarks. Because the restrictions apply to all
commercial speech, not just false and misleading speech, the
grounds for the protection of trademarks may not be sturdy enough
to stand up to commercial free speech interests protected by the
First Amendment.'"
While a purpose of the Act was to ensure that courts are
"authorized to enjoin unauthorized commercial uses of famous
marks that may fall short of technical trademark use"189 and to
"preclude the courts from enjoining speech that courts have
recognized to be constitutionally protected,""9 Congress realized
first amendment issues were a potential conflict. Congress was
familiar with the free speech concerns in prohibiting trademark
dilution' after the House Judiciary Committee deleted dilution
provisions from a proposed act to revise trademark law in 1987.192
The Committee removed the dilution provisions due to first
amendment concerns raised in the House of Representatives. 93
3M Denicola, supra note 97, at 195-97.
,87 McCarthy, supra note 14, § 31:139 and § 31:153.
8 Max, supra note 8, at c14.
1M Statement of International Trademark Association before the Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representa-
tives on H.R. 1295 and H.R. 1270, at 10 (July 17, 1995) [hereinafter "INTA Statement"].
"
8 See INTA Statement at 10.
191 Denicola, supra note 97, at 190-95.
1'2 See H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 5 (1988).
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In supporting the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
Sen. Orin Hatch stated that the "proposal adequately addresses
legitimate First Amendment concerns espoused by the broadcasting
industry and the media. The bill will not prohibit or threaten
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and
other forms of expression that are not a part of a commercial
transaction."194 Congressional awareness is further evidenced by
the references in the legislative history to the First Amend-
ment.'95
* The proposal adequately addresses legitimate [flirst
[a] mendment concerns espoused by the broadcasting
industry and the media. The bill will not prohibit or
threaten "noncommercial" expression, as that term
has been defined by the courts. Nothing in this bill
is intended to alter existing case law on the subject
of what constitutes "commercial" speech. The bill
includes specific language exempting from liability
the "fair use" of a mark in the context of comparative
commercial advertising or promotion as well as all
forms of news reporting and news commentary. The
latter provision which was added ... as a result of
an amendment offered by Congressman Moorhead
that was adopted by the Committee, recognizes the
heightened [first [a]mendment protection afforded
the news industry.'96
Courts have widely recognized that the government may ban
commercial speech that relates to illegal information or is false.'97
However, "the government's power is more circumscribed" when the
information is not false or linked with illegal activity.9 8 Under
this scenario, restrictions are not "sustained if they provide remote
rather than direct advancement of the claimed interest, or if the
" 141 CONG. REC. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
1" H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029-31.
I9 d. at 4-5.
197 Max, supra note 8, at c14.
'" Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
564 [Vol. 5:539
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governmental interest could be achieved through more limited
restrictions."'99
Since the Trademark Dilution Act does not provide a definition
of commercial speech, the commercial element will certainly
present a problem for parodists. However, the United States
Supreme Court has suggested a test for identifying commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.2" In that case, the Court held that commercial
speech is determined by whether the speech relates "solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience,"20 ' thereby
"propos[ing] a commercial transaction."2 2 The Court's definition
of commercial speech supports the policies of furthering the
speaker's economic interest and benefiting consumers by providing
the fullest possible dissemination of data.0 3
The Supreme Court specifically considered the free flow of
commercial information in the trademark context in Friedman v.
Rogers.2" There the Court confronted the issue whether a state
law that prohibited optometrists from practicing under a trade
name was an unconstitutional restriction under the First Amend-
ment.20 5 The Court, holding that the law was not unconstitution-
al, reiterated that "[slociety has a strong interest in the free-flow
of commercial information, both because the efficient allocation of
resources depends upon informed consumer choices and because
even an individual advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,'
may be of general public interest."0 8 However, some restrictions
are permitted provided they serve a significant government interest
and leave open alternative channels for communication.20 7
1 1 Id. The Supreme Court has chosen a four-part analysis for commercial speech. If the
speech relates to lawful activity and is not misleading, the restriction will only be upheld if
the governmental interest is substantial, the interest is directly advanced by the regulation
and the restriction is not unnecessarily broad. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 507 (1981).
200 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
2' Id. at 561.
"o Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340
(1986).
' Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561-562.
2'4 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
id. at 3.
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Furthermore, courts have recognized that parody is a form of
"artistic expression" that deserves more than narrow first amend-
ment protection, 20 8 and where an expressive work is alleged to
infringe a trademark, it is "appropriate to weigh the public interest
in free expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion."209  In light of these concerns, one can see that a
conflict exists between the public and the parodist's interest in
expression and trademark protection.
McCarthy suggests that tarnishment caused by parody which
satirizes a product or its image is not actionable under an anti-
dilution statute due to the first amendment free speech con-
cerns. 210  It should be noted however, that McCarthy, like- the
authors of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, draws a distinction
in free speech protection depending upon the use of the trademark.
First Amendment concerns are "much lessened where the parody
is a trademark used to identify a commercial product."2 1
The Restatement of Unfair Competition also notes that anti-
dilution statutes do not apply when trademarks are used to
"comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or. disparage the [plaintiff]
or the [plaintiffs] goods."212 The plaintiff only has a cause of
action, without confusion, if the defendant's conduct meets the
requirements of defamation, invasion of privacy, or injurious
falsehood. 213 The comments further expand on the potential first
amendment issues involved.
Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d
Cir. 1989). See also Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
14 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that 'parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both
as entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism.") (emphasis added).
2 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494. As a result, the court applied a balancing approach for
parody that considers the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods in question.
The court felt such a test would allow parodies greater latitude due to the need to evoke the
original work being parodied. Id. at 495.
210 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:105. See also L.L. Bean v. Drake Publ. Inc., 811
F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that "fiJf the anti-dilution statute were construed as
permitting a trademark owner to enjoin the use of his mark in a noncommercial context
found to be negative or offensive, then a corporation could shield itself from criticism by
forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct.").
211 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:105.
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The [Supreme] Court's decisions permit narrowly-
tailored restrictions on commercial speech that
directly further a substantial state interest. There is
no indication that the [Flirst [A]mendment limits
application of the antidilution statutes in the context
of a subsequent use of a mark as a trademark by
another. Use of another's trademark, not as a means
of identifying the user's own goods or services, but as
an incident of speech directed at the trademark
owner, however, raises serious free speech concerns
that cannot be easily accommodated under tradition-
al trademark doctrine. The expression of an idea by
means of the use of another's trademark in a parody,
for example, will often lie within the substantial
constitutional protection accorded noncommercial
speech and may thus be the subject of liability only
in the most narrow circumstances.1 4
VIII. OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO TRADEMARK OWNERS
Additional support for a lenient judicial application of dilution to
parody is the fact that remedies already exist for truly damaging
uses of trademarks. No trademark owner is at the mercy of those
who would criticize or belittle the mark or the owner. Traditional
common law and statutory remedies will still safeguard the
trademark if the speech extends beyond constitutional grounds.2"5
Defamation and false advertising provide a cause of action for
injured trademarks and trademark owners.216 If the defendant's
use of the trademark implies false statements about the trademark
owner or the quality of the product, the tort of injurious falsehood
can provide adequate relief.217 If a use or commentary on a mark
defames the reputation of the owner, the law of defamation may
provide a cause of action. 218 The Restatement also notes that the
right of privacy may be applicable to a nontrademark use of a
"' Id. at cmt. i of § 25(2).
2's Denicola, supra note 97, at 198-99.
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mark, but as yet no case has applied the right of privacy in such a
context.219
In reality the protection provided by the law of defamation may
be very limited. The Supreme Court has found that only a small
area of defamatory speech is protected.' ° In New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, the Court held that an editorial advertisement in
support of the civil rights movement was constitutionally protected
speech and therefore, not libelous.221 The Court stated that
erroneous speech against a public party is only protected if it was
not made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."222
False advertising may also provide a cause of action for trade-
mark owners whose marks have been used in a misleading manner.
The elements of a prima facie case of false advertising under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act require a plaintiff to prove that
the defendant (1) used a misleading or false description of fact in
interstate commerce, (2) in connection with goods or services in
commercial advertising or promotions, (3) that the description
misrepresented the nature of the goods, services or commercial
activities of the defendant or another person, and (4) the plaintiff
has been or is likely to be damaged by the illegal acts.22 The
intent of this statute was to protect parties in commerce from
unfair competition by prohibiting the deceptive use of trade-
marks.2
24
Furthermore, if damage to the reputation of the product or owner
is the true concern of courts and trademark owners, as the
tarnishment and blurring doctrines indicate, a general disclaimer
should be sufficient. A parodist could then relieve himself of any
potential liability and prevent harm to the owner's reputation via
one minor step. But under no circumstances should a trademark
owner be able to completely insulate his mark against all constitu-
tional speech by invoking a proprietary interest in the symbol.225
219 Id.
' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).221 Id.
Id. at 280.
McCarthy, supra note 14, § 27:24.
2U id. at § 27:25.
20 Denicola, supra note 97, at 199.
[Vol. 5:539568
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Expanding an owner's right to control a likeness or symbol has
already been restricted in one area of the law, the right of publicity
doctrine.2 While the right to exploit one's own name and like-
ness has received acceptance, the courts have limited this power
when it interferes with free speech interests.227 In many ways a
trademark is analogous to a famous name. Both symbolize and
identify an entity, although the trademark is more limited because
it is only a visual representation. Both have been deemed to be
valuable goods. Thus, because trademarks and famous names
serve the same function, it is "not surprising that the [Clonstitution
demands similar restraint in the recognition of trademark
rights."
228
IX. POLICY REASONS FOR GRANTING LENIENCY TO PARODY
USES OF MARKS
A. SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO TRADEMARK OWNER
Any harm that may befall a trademark owner as a result of a
parody is much less severe than harm from other unauthorized
uses. For example, using the "Lardashe" trademark on blue jeans
will certainly spark a laugh but will not damage the "Jordache"
name as would using the name "Jordache" on an inferior den-
im.229 Similarly, jesting at the expense of a trademark is not
comparable to using the mark on the defendant's competing product
line. The crucial connection between parody and a trademark is
recognition of the mark and its image. In this respect, the parody
provides a reinforcement of the attributes of the mark by calling
attention to them. One author suggests, "a trademark parody
dilutes its target only by adding a humorous picture of the mark to
the collection of images the owner has created for it.""0




Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216
(10th Cir. 1987).
mShaughnessy, supra note 100, at 1113.
19981 569
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B. BENEFIT TO THE PARODIST
As discussed above, the parodist has a strong interest in using
trademarks. A trademark is often the simplest way to symbolize
a lifestyle, a personality trait, a product or the trademark own-
er-all of which can be humorous subjects. In Cliffs Notes,231 the
parodist could have commented on the "ironic, sophisticated" 2
traits of an urbane 20th-century novel without using the format of
Cliff Notes published book reports. However, the academic,
straightforward style used by Cliff Notes provided a humorous
vehicle for the parodist's ideas. 3
C. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Ultimately the public interest is the most important and most
variable factor involved in any constitutional analysis of a trade-
mark parody. While the public has an interest in exposure to the
commentary that the parodist has to offer, the public also may bear
any economic burden resulting from the parody. For example, if
the trademark owner takes action to rehabilitate the trademark's
image through positive exposure and advertising the public will
ultimately bear the cost.' Higher product prices for the consum-
er will be the result. Furthermore, without the parody the public
is denied access to the ideas the parodist sought to present, because
it is unlikely the trademark owner will present a parody or third-
party commentary on his product after investing time and money
to create a specific image.
X. CONCLUSION
While the Federal Trademark Dilution Act effectively prohibits
trademark dilution in the United States, it is questionable whether
the Act adequately protects the use of trademarks in the parody
' Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1989) (dismissing an order for an injunction reasoning that public interest in free expression
outweighs the small risk of consumer confusion).
Id. at 492.
Id.
2' Shaughnessy, supra note 100, at 1114.
570 [Vol. 5:539
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context. Despite its shortcomings, the Act lays the groundwork for
several viable defenses for parodists: the noncommercial use, the
distinctive and famous requirements, and the First Amendment.
Through these defenses, courts have been given discretionary
leeway and should allow the use of trademarks in parodies that do
not seek to mislead the public or compete with the owner's mark.
While parody may often be offensive, it is still "deserving of
substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social
and literary criticism."" 5 A parodist should not lose the cloak of
protection afforded by the Constitution simply because his subject
is a famous trademark.
NATALIE A. DOPSON
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